Capabilities and Effects

Aaron Craig, Alex Potanin, Lindsay Groves ECS, VUW, NZ alex@ecs.vuw.ac.nz

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1 Introduction

Capability-safe languages prohibit the *ambient authority* [5] that is present in non-capability-safe languages. An implementation of a logger in OCaml or Java, for example, does not need to be passed a capability at initialisation time; it can simply import the appropriate file-access library and open the log file for appending itself. Critically, a malicious implementation of such a component could also delete the log, read from another file, or exfiltrate logging information over the network. Other mechanisms such as sandboxing can be used to limit the effects of such malicious components, but recent work has found that Java's sandbox (for example) is difficult to use and is therefore often misused [1].

If capabilities are useful for *informal* reasoning, shouldn't they also aid in formal reasoning? Work by Drossopoulou et al. [4] sheds some light on this question by presenting a logic that formalizes capability-based reasoning about trust between objects. Two other trains of work, rather than formalise capability-based reasoning itself, reason about how capabilities may be used. Dimoulas et al. [3] developed a formalism for reasoning about which components may use a capability and which may influence (perhaps indirectly) the use of a capability. Devriese et al. [2] formulate an effect parametricity theorem that limits the effects of an object based on the capabilities it possesses, and then use logical relations to reason about capability use in higher-order settings. Overall, this prior work presents new formal systems for reasoning about capability use, or reasoning about new properties using capabilities.

We are interested in a different question: *can capabilities be used to enhance formal reasoning that is currently done without relying on capabilities*? In other words, what value do capabilities add to existing formal reasoning?

To answer this question, we decided to pick a simple and practical formal reasoning system, and see if capability-based reasoning could help. A natural choice for our investigation Jonathan Aldrich ISR, CMU, USA jonathan.aldrich@cs.cmu.edu

is effect systems [6] — a relatively simple formal reasoning approach that can make the difference made by capabilities more obvious. Furthermore, effects have an intuitive link to capabilities: in a system that uses capabilities to protect resources, an expression can only have an effect on a resource if it is given a capability to do so.

How could capabilities help with effects? One challenge to the wider adoption of effect systems is their annotation overhead [7]. Effect inference can be used to reduce the annotations required, but this has significant drawbacks: understanding error messages that arise through effect inference requires a detailed understanding of the internal structure of the code, not just its interface. Capabilities are a promising alternative for reducing the overhead of effect annotations, as suggested by the following example:

import log : String -> Unit with {File.write} in e

In a capability-safe language, what can we infer about the effects on resources (e.g. the file system or network) when evaluating the unannotated code e? Since we are in a capability-safe language, e has no ambient authority, and so the only way it can have any effect on resources is via the log function it imports from its annotated surroundings. Note that this reasoning requires nothing about e other than that it obeys the rules of a capability-safe language; in particular, we don't require any effect annotations within e, and we don't need to analyse its structure as an effect inference would have to do. e could also be arbitrarily large, perhaps consisting of an entire program that we have downloaded from a source that we trust enough to allow it to write to a log, but that we don't trust to access any other resources. Thus in this scenario, capabilities can be used to reason "for free" about the effect of a large body of code based on a few annotations on the components it imports.

The central intuition is this: the effect of an unannotated expression can be given a bound based on the effects latent in variables that are in scope. Of course, there are challenges to solve on the way, most notably involving higher-order programs: how can we generalise this intuition if log takes a higher-order argument? If e evaluates not to unit but to a function, what can we infer about that function's effects?

2 Unannotated Client

Consider the following example. There is a single primitive capability File, exposing some operations to a system

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resource. A logger module possessing this capability exposes a function log which incurs File.write when executed. The client module, possessing the logger module, exposes a function run which invokes logger.log, incurring File.write. While logger has been annotated, client has not. If client.run is executed, what effects might it have?

```
module def logger(f: {File}):Logger
      def log(): Unit with {File.append} =
2
         f.append(``message logged'')
3
4
   module def client(logger: Logger)
5
      def run(): Unit =
6
         logger.log()
7
8
   require File
9
   instantiate logger(File)
10
   instantiate client(logger)
11
   client.run()
12
```

Our proposal translates the Wyvern code above to a set of simple nested functions following Newspeak-style object capabilities, as shown below. The first two functions, MakeLogger and MakeClient, instantiate the logger and client modules. Lines 1-3 define MakeLogger. When given a File, it returns a function representing logger.log. Lines 5-8 define MakeClient. When given a Logger, it returns a function representing client.run. Lines 10-14 define MakeMain which returns a function that, when executed, instantiates all other modules and executes the code in the body of Main. Program execution begins on line 16, where the initial capabilities are passed into Main - in this case, just File.

```
let MakeLogger =
1
        (\lambda f: File.
2
           \lambda x: Unit. f.append) in
3
    let MakeClient =
5
        (\lambda \text{logger: Unit} \rightarrow_{\{\text{File.append}\}} \text{Unit.}
6
           import(File.append) 1 = logger in
7
               \lambda x: Unit. l unit) in
8
9
    let MakeMain =
10
        (\lambda f: File.
11
               let loggerModule = MakeLogger f in
12
               let clientModule = MakeClient loggerModule in
13
               clientModule unit) in
14
15
    MakeMain File
```

16

On line 7, an import expression selects the authority {File.append} for its unannotated body on line 8. This is a well-typed example, as the body can be typechecked using only those free variables imported, and the authority passed in via the logger function does not exceed {File.append}. It

is therefore safe to assume that {File.append} is an upperbound on the effects incurred from evaluating the body; indeed, a lambda abstraction has no effect, though it could be used to incur one later. But since it was defined inside the import expression (or passed into it), it must also have the effects contained in {File.append}, so we can effect-check it as such without having to annotate or infer its parts.

Polymorphic Effects 3

The previous example shows how capability safety can be used to infer the effects in unannotated code by inspecting the capabilites we pass into it. We saw an example where functions with a fixed set of effects were imported, but the same reasoning also applies to types which are polymorphic over a set of effects, such as the function below, which is polymorphic over the {File.write, Socket.write} effects. After fixing a particular subset Φ of these effects, it asks for a function with those effects and then incurs them.

```
polywriter =
     \lambda \Phi \subseteq \{ \text{File.write}, \text{Socket.write} \}.
           (\lambda f: \text{Unit} \rightarrow_{\Phi} \text{Unit. f unit})
```

If a piece of unannotated code were given a polywriter, it would be safe to approximate its effects as the polymorphic upper bound {File.write, Socket.write}. But we can do better: if no capability for Socket.write is passed in with the polywriter, then although it could theoretically accept functions which incur Socket.write, it will never be able to obtain one. The example below shows such a situation:

```
import({File.write})
  pw = polywriter
   fw = (\lambda f: Unit. File.write)
in
   е
```

Since only a file-writing capability is passed in with poly writer, it can never be made to incur Socket.write, so a better approximation of *e* would be {File.write}. While a full exploration of capability rules for effect polymorphism is still being finalised, the discussion above suggests the potential to extend the ideas here to a polymorphic setting.

References

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